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TAYLOR V. RIOJAS: ANATOMY OF A
SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION THAT
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY
By Zamir Ben-Dan*
INTRODUCTION
In September 2013, an inmate in a Texas prison allegedly spent six days in
two uninhabitable cells.1 One cell was covered in “massive amounts of feces”;
the other cell was freezing cold and lacked a sink, a bunk, and a toilet,
containing only a clogged floor drain for him to relieve himself. 2 The very
thought that a human being would be caged under such appalling conditions
should shock the conscious of any person who hears about it; and few
laypersons would doubt that confining a person under these circumstances is
plainly illegal. Yet, it took seven years and an unlikely Supreme Court
intervention for an official pronouncement that, if indeed the inmate was
incarcerated under such conditions for almost a full week, those responsible for
his confinement violated clearly established constitutional law. 3
In between those seven years, two different federal courts—the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals—dismissed the inmate’s Eighth Amendment claims and
granted qualified immunity to the officials responsible for the inmate’s
confinement in the two disgusting cells.4 The flagrant violation of this inmate’s
Eighth Amendment rights is obvious and totally outrageous; but the biggest
disgrace is that the Fifth Circuit needed the Supreme Court to tell them that.
Both lower courts placed heavy emphasis on one line from a 1978 Supreme
Court decision, and relied on prior fifth circuit caselaw that also depended on
the same line from the same Supreme Court decision.5 This note will review
these decisions, concluding that both opinions display a blatant disregard for
both the humanity of the inmate and basic common sense.
* Staff Attorney, Community Justice Unit of the Legal Aid Society; Adjunct Professor,
CUNY School of Law; Adjunct Professor, Baruch College – Black and Latino Studies;
B.B.A., Baruch College, J.D., CUNY Law. Acknowledgments to the staff of the Nevada
Law Journal for editing and publishing this piece.
1 Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2019).
2 Id. at 218–19.
3 See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020).
4 See Taylor, 946 F.3d at 216–17.
5 See id. at 220, 222; Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2017).
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WHAT HAPPENED

On September 6, 2013, Trent Michael Taylor was placed in a cell at the
John Montford Unit, a psychiatric unit in a Texas prison.6 Virtually the entire
cell—the floor, ceilings, walls, and the window—were thoroughly covered with
human feces.7 He feared to eat inside the cell for fear of contamination, and
feared to consume water because the faucet was also packed with feces. 8 If this
were not bad enough, Taylor was placed inside the cell completely naked. 9 He
complained about the decrepit condition of the cell, but prison officials neither
cleaned the cell nor moved him to a different cell.10 Three of the officers
laughed at him and said that he was “going to have a long weekend.”11 Another
officer remarked: “[d]ude, this is [M]ontford, there is shit in all these cells from
years of psych patients.”12 Taylor was kept inside this cell for the next four
days, finally being removed from it on September 10, 2013.13
The following day, on September 11, 2013, Taylor was placed inside a
different cell.14 This cell was freezing cold because the air conditioner was
always on;15 other prisoners dubbed the cell “the cold room.”16 One of the
prison officials allegedly said that he hoped Taylor would “fucking freeze.” 17
Like in the first cell, he was confined in the second cell without any clothing. 18
This second cell had no bunk, no sink, and no toilet.19 The only thing the cell
had was a drain hole in the floor, which he was expected to use when he needed
to relieve himself.20 The drain hole smelled strongly of ammonia, making it
hard to breathe.21 Additionally, the drain hole “was clogged with raw sewage
that seeped onto the floor where he was forced to sleep . . . .”22 His repeated
requests for a bathroom break were refused; and prison officials ordered him to
urinate in the drain.23 Taylor tried to hold his urine, but eventually urinated on
himself involuntarily.24 He was forced to remain in this cell for two days.25 At
6

Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218.
Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 218 n.9.
17 Id.
18 Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5,
2017).
19 Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218.
20 See id. at 218–19.
21 Id. at 218.
22 Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2.
23 Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218–19.
24 Id. at 219.
7

Spring 2021]

TAYLOR V. RIOJAS

25

some point, the officers tried to place him back inside the first cell, but he
refused and threatened to harm himself.26
Taylor asserted that as a result of being subjected to those conditions, he
experienced chest pains, burning to his eyes and throat, and severe bladder
pain.27 He further had to be taken to the emergency room and catheterized; and
this trip to the hospital came only after he made repeated requests for medical
assistance on September 13, 2013, the day he was taken out of the second
cell.28 Taylor further averred that he suffered a lasting bladder injury, and
suffered from bladder and urinary incontinence and spasms.29
II. THE RATIONALES OF THE TWO LOWER COURT OPINIONS
In September 2014, Taylor filed a civil rights lawsuit against Texas prison
officials on a host of claims.30 Among those claims were that the prison
officials responsible for his confinement between September 6, 2013, and
September 14, 2013, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him
to imprisonment under those conditions.31 On January 22, 2016, a magistrate
judge in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
recommended that the majority of Taylor’s claims be dismissed for failure to
state a claim.32 With respect to the Eighth Amendment violation, the magistrate
judge found those related claims to be sufficiently pled and recommended that
the motion to dismiss be denied as to those claims.33 On March 29, 2016, a
senior district judge fully adopted the recommendations of the magistrate
judge, and Taylor’s Eighth Amendment claims survived the defendants’ motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.34

25

See id.
Id.; Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2. It is unclear at what point the officials tried to
place Taylor back inside the cell. In the district court decision, officials tried to place him
back in that cell before placing him in the second cell; in the Fifth Circuit’s decision,
officials tried to place him back in the first cell after he spent two days in the second cell. See
Taylor, 946 F.3d at 218; Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2.
27 Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *2.
28
Id.
29 Id.
30 Complaint at 1, 17–32, Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2014).
31 Taylor v. Williams, No. 5:14-CV-149-BG, 2016 WL 8674566, at *3–5 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
22, 2016).
32 Id. at *6–7.
33 Id. at *5.
34 Taylor v. Williams, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2016 WL 1271054, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 29,
2016).
26
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A. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas Finds
No Eighth Amendment Violation.
On January 5, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on Taylor’s Eighth Amendment claims.35 The court noted that the
defendants offered “little in the way of specific summary judgment evidence to
support their assertion that the cells were not, in fact, covered with
feces . . . .”36 The court further pointed out how much the defendants harped on
Taylor allegedly being “a compulsive cleaner,”37 a claim which implies a
recognition on their part that the cells were indeed filthy. The court also found
no evidence that Taylor had been provided cleaning supplies, 38 so it seems
rather clear that the evidence before the court was that Taylor spent six days in
two outrageously filthy cells. Nonetheless, the court found that the prison
officials involved did not violate Taylor’s Eighth Amendment rights by
subjecting him to those conditions.39
The trial court unreasonably extrapolated from one line in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hutto v. Finney,40 improperly calling it a “holding.”41 In
Hutto, several plaintiffs brought action alleging the conditions of their
confinement to be unconstitutional.42 Inmates placed in punitive segregation
had to share 8’x10’ cells with at least three other inmates, and oftentimes
more.43 They were forced to sleep on mattresses on the floor; and, despite the
fact that some of the inmates had contagious diseases, the mattresses were piled
together every morning and randomly assigned every night.44 The inmates were
inadequately fed as well, receiving less than one thousand calories a day in
sustenance.45 Importantly, there were no limits as to how long an inmate spent
in punitive segregation.46 All of this led the district court to find these
conditions unconstitutional and, among other things, to impose a thirty-day
limit on punitive segregation sentences.47 The federal appeals court affirmed
the district court’s decision, as did the United States Supreme Court.48
In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] filthy, overcrowded cell
and a diet of ‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for
35

Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8, *11 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5,
2017).
36 Id. at *7.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at *7–*8.
40
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
41
Taylor, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8.
42
Hutto, 437 U.S. at 678.
43 Id. at 682.
44 Id. at 682–83.
45 Id. at 683.
46 Id. at 682.
47 Id. at 684.
48 Id. at 680–81.
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weeks or months.”49 This line is not a holding, and could not be reasonably
construed as such.50 Further, this statement must be read within the context of
the Court’s discussion regarding punitive segregation and the specific facts of
the case. The length of the confinement was an issue in Hutto because a)
durations of confinement had been indeterminate;51 and b) the district court’s
imposition of thirty-day limits was challenged, or rather, mischaracterized as a
broader conclusion that indeterminate sentences can never be constitutional. 52
That one line in Hutto cannot reasonably be interpreted as allowing
confinement under any circumstances, insofar as it only lasts for a few days.53
If the conditions of confinement are extreme enough—like if a person were to
be subject to cold temperatures at night and not provided a blanket54—there can
be an Eighth Amendment violation, regardless of whether or not the conditions
lasted days or weeks. Strangely enough, the Fifth Circuit seemed to recognize
this in its decision in Palmer v. Johnson.55
Nonetheless, the trial court in Taylor’s case construed this one line from
Hutto to condition a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation on the duration
of the circumstances, irrespective of how intolerable or barbaric the
circumstances are for an inmate.56 The appellate authority on which the trial
court chiefly relies for its conclusion,57 Davis v. Scott,58 does the same thing.59
In Davis, the appeals court found no Eighth Amendment violation where the
plaintiff spent three days in a cell with “blood on the walls and excretion on the
floors and bread loaf on the floor.”60 Using Hutto, the Davis court reasoned that
the federal constitution permitted prison officials to detain the plaintiff in the
cell since it was “for only three days.”61 The Davis court further explained that
the plaintiff was given cleaning supplies when he complained about the
conditions, thereby “mitigating any intolerable conditions.” 62 The trial court
applied Davis to the facts here even though the length of confinement was
twice as long and even though Taylor, unlike the plaintiff in Davis, was not
provided cleaning supplies.63
49

Id. at 686–87.
See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 55–56 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring).
51 Hutto, 437 U.S. at 682.
52 Id. at 685.
53 See Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 56 (Alito, J., concurring).
54 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
55 See Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352–54 (5th Cir. 1999).
56 See Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5,
2017).
57 Id.
58 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003 (5th Cir. 1998).
59 See id. at 1006.
60 Id. at 1004, 1006.
61 See id. at 1006.
62 Id. (citations omitted).
63 See Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *7–*8 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
5, 2017).
50
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To the district court, the federal constitution permitted a human being to be
imprisoned first in a feces-filled cell, and then in a second cell in frigid
temperature with no bunk, no toilet, no sink, and a hole in the floor—smelling
of ammonia and overflowing with raw sewage—because the total confinement
“only” lasted for six days.64
B. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Finds an Eighth Amendment Violation,
but Also Finds that Prison Officials Did Not Have “Fair Warning” that
Their Behavior Was Unconstitutional.
On December 20, 2019, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s ruling on those specific claims, albeit on slightly different
grounds.65 The appeals court still found that summary judgment was
appropriate, but not because there was no constitutional violation. 66 Indeed, the
appellate court found that Taylor’s Eighth Amendment rights were infringed
upon.67 The court correctly noted that the length of time was a non-dispositive
factor to be considered.68 The court further found that Davis was inapplicable,
both due to the longer length of time in Taylor’s case and the fact that prison
officials did not provide Taylor with cleaning supplies, unlike the plaintiff in
Davis.69 The court noted how “obvious” the danger of Taylor being exposed to
bodily waste was, especially given that he was made to sleep on a urine-soaked
floor without any clothing.70
Yet, as “obvious” as the risks were, the appellate court granted qualified
immunity on the ground that the prison officials “weren’t on ‘fair warning’ that
their specific acts were unconstitutional.”71 This bears repeating: the court
found that the prison officials might not have known that confining Taylor in a
cell filled from floor to ceiling with human feces for four days, and then in an
extremely cold cell with no sink, toilet, or bunk for two days—where he had to
sleep completely naked on a urine-soaked floor—would violate the
constitution.72 In arriving at this preposterous decision, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals played on that same line from Hutto, finding that the dicta in the
Supreme Court’s decision created “ambiguity” with respect to what constituted
impermissible confinement conditions.73 The appellate court also cited to its
decision in McCord v. Maggio,74 which dealt with a ten-month period of

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

See id. at *2, *8.
Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2019).
See id. at 218.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 220 (citing Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 221.
See id. at 222.
Id.
See id.
See id.
McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991).
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confinement.75 So once again, the granting of qualified immunity for these
defendants in Taylor’s case turned not on the nature of the conditions, but on
the fact that the conditions “only” lasted for six days.76
Even before the Supreme Court’s intervention in this case, there were clear
indications that the Fifth Circuit’s decision did not square with the high court’s
jurisprudence. For example, the Court opined in Wilson v. Seiter that exposing
an inmate to cold temperatures without providing sufficient means to stay
warm would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. 77 That clearly
happened in Taylor’s case, at least with respect to his confinement in the
second prison cell—it was freezing cold, and Taylor did not even have clothes
on.78 Beyond that, the Supreme Court has indicated that qualified immunity is
inappropriate where the unlawfulness of the conduct is apparent.79 It is difficult
to imagine a scenario where the illegality is less apparent, given how the Fifth
Circuit found that prison officials engaged in misconduct and disregarded the
“obvious” risks of that misconduct.
Aside from that, common sense seems to have evaded both lower courts. It
goes without saying that humans should not be unnecessarily exposed to human
feces. Prolonged or unnecessary exposure to human waste is not merely
“uncomfortable” as the trial court posited.80 The World Health Organization
noted how human waste has been linked to the transmission of a wide array of
infectious diseases.81 Scholarly articles have been written advocating for proper
waste disposal systems, because a lack of such systems can have disastrous
health effects.82 Other appellate courts have also recognized that exposure to
human waste heightens Eighth Amendment concerns.83 But even on a more
basic level, it is common knowledge that human beings should not defecate
anywhere and wallow in feces. People generally know to go to designated
places when they need to relieve themselves; they are called bathrooms. It is
further common knowledge that defecating anywhere would not only make
places unsanitary, but also unhealthy. Being in a small environment that is

75

Taylor, 946 F.3d at 219, 222.
See id. at 222.
77
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
78 Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020).
79 E.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
80 See Taylor v. Stevens, No. 5:14-CV-149-C, 2017 WL 11507190, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5,
2017).
81 Richard Carr, Excreta-Related Infections and the Role of Sanitation in the Control of
Transmission,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.
90
(2001),
https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/iwachap5.pdf.
82 See, e.g., C. Rose et al., The Characterization of Feces and Urine: A Review of the
Literature to Inform Advanced Treatment Technology, 45 CRITICAL REVIEWS ENVTL. SCI. &
TECH.
1827,
1828
(May
29,
2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4500995/.
83 See, e.g., McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 2001); Fruit v. Norris, 905
F.2d 1147, 1151 (8th Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1989);
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)
76
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covered with “massive amounts of feces” is beyond unusual; forcing a human
being to remain in that environment, even for a day, is beyond cruel.
It is further clear that both lower courts have lost sight of not just Taylor’s
humanity, but the humanity of inmates generally. It is not as if the two cells
Taylor was housed in were the only two cells available for placement during
those six days.84 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit provided “no evidence that the
conditions of Taylor’s confinement were compelled by necessity or
exigency.”85 Nor did the Fifth Circuit explain why the nature of Taylor’s
imprisonment “could not have been mitigated, either in degree or duration.”86
In fact, the Fifth Circuit’s factual record suggests that not only was the
confinement unnecessary, but it was also sadistic.87 The officials laughed at
Taylor while he was in the first cell, declaring that he would have “a long
weekend” in a cell they knew to be filled with feces.88 They must have known
that he was not eating during those first four days, given that Taylor declined to
eat for fear of contamination.89 One official allegedly hoped he would freeze in
the second cell, dubbed “the cold room” by other inmates.90 The officials told
him to urinate in a drain hole that smelled of ammonia and overflowed with
raw sewage; and they refused to escort him to the bathroom for a twenty-four
hour period.91 How either the district court could rule that this was not
unconstitutional, or the appellate court could find the unconstitutionality of this
conduct to not be “beyond debate,” utterly boggles the mind.
It is further baffling how the Fifth Circuit arrived at its conclusion in light
of its decision in Palmer v. Johnson.92 In Palmer, the appellate court found a
clear Eighth Amendment violation where an inmate was confined to a sixhundred-square-foot area with forty-nine other inmates for a period of
seventeen hours.93 The Palmer court specifically found barbaric a) the fact that
the plaintiff was told he had to urinate or defecate within the confined space; 94
and b) that Palmer was denied sufficient means of keeping warm and was
forced to endure cold temperatures.95 While there are distinctions between
Palmer and the instant matter, it is difficult to see how the concerns the Fifth
Circuit had in Palmer do not apply here. Like the plaintiff in Palmer, Taylor
was without a toilet in the second cell, and for a longer period than the plaintiff
in Palmer.96 Also like the plaintiff in Palmer, Taylor was subjected to frigid
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020).
Id.
Id.
See Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 218 n.9.
Id. at 218–19.
See Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 349, 353–54.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 352–53.
See Taylor, 946 F.3d at 223–25.

Spring 2021]

TAYLOR V. RIOJAS

31

temperatures in the second cell; and unlike the plaintiff in Palmer, Taylor did
not even have clothing on.97 If the plaintiff in Palmer had “clearly established
rights under the Eighth Amendment,”98 then so too did Taylor. The Fifth
Circuit should have followed Palmer in this case.
III. AN UNLIKELY INTERVENTION
It is quite disturbing to think that if the Supreme Court of the United States
had not granted certiorari—and at least one justice was of the opinion that
certiorari should not have been granted99—a flagrant violation of the Eighth
Amendment would have been sanctioned and the purveyors of that violation
absolved of any liability. Thankfully, however, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in this case; and on November 2, 2020, the Court reversed the
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.100 The high court referred to the
facts of the case as “particularly egregious” and found that “no reasonable
correctional officer could have concluded that, under the extreme
circumstances of this case, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor
in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for such an extended period of
time.”101 Seven justices joined in the majority, with one of the seven justices
issuing a concurrence.102 One justice dissented without an opinion, and the last
justice took no part in the consideration of the case.103
This decision should not be taken lightly. Over the past few years, the
Supreme Court has been roundly criticized as a racist, classist, and politically
conservative court.104 Further, the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity
doctrine and jurisprudence has contributed to a disturbing pattern of state actors

97

See id. at 218–20.
Palmer, 193 F.3d at 353.
99 See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54–56 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 53–54.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 52–56.
103 See id. at 54.
104 See, e.g., Sabeel Rahman, The US Supreme Court Has Become a Threat to Democracy.
Here's
How
We
Fix
It,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
24, 2020,
8:19
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/sep/24/supreme-court-threat-todemocracy-rbg-how-we-fix-it; Neil S. Siegel, The Supreme Court Is Avoiding Talking About
Race,
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
7,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/supreme-court-doesnt-like-talk-aboutrace/614944/; Dahlia Lithwick, Former Judge Resigns from the Supreme Court Bar, SLATE
(Mar. 13, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/03/judge-jamesdannenberg-supreme-court-bar-roberts-letter.amp; Dahlia Lithwick, How the Roberts Court
Abandoned Bipartisan Consensus, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2019, 11:14 AM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/11/john-roberts-court-abandoned-bipartisanconsensus-dark-money-republican-donors.html; IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS:
HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS
84–86, 104 (2014); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 108–09 (2010).
98
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being absolved of liability for serious misconduct.105 In light of this, that this
Supreme Court found the circumstances in this case “particularly egregious”
says a lot about how obviously inhumane the circumstances truly were for
Taylor. It also speaks volumes about the two lower courts that viewed the same
facts and found no actionable constitutional violation.
The concurring justice, Samuel Alito, opposed the granting of review in
this case and wrote that the decision “adds virtually nothing to the law going
forward.”106 Ideally, this may not necessarily be true. Aside from serving as a
much-needed rebuke of the Fifth Circuit, this decision sets at least some bounds
on what conduct clearly constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation within the
cell confinement context. This decision also provides some clarity on the line
from Hutto that the Fifth Circuit used to validate inexcusable conduct. This
same line has been invoked by other federal circuit courts as a rule of sorts. 107
Perhaps the Supreme Court’s clarity can positively influence future decisions in
this area of law.
Additionally, the Court’s decision may influence the Fifth Circuit to revisit
its jurisprudence in this area and, most importantly, to rethink its decision in
Davis v. Scott. There is no reason why it should be impermissible for a human
being to be confined under plainly unsanitary conditions for six days, but
somehow acceptable if it were only for three days. That the plaintiff in Davis
was given cleaning supplies did not seem to make the difference; it is apparent
from the decision that the federal appeals court would have found no violation
regardless of whether or not the plaintiff had been given cleaning supplies. 108
The Fifth Circuit should reconsider what precedential value Davis should have
going forward.
Finally, the Court’s decision should remind everyone that convicts,
detainees, and inmates are nonetheless human beings and should be treated as
such. It should put officials at prisons and jails throughout America on notice
that there are limits to their authority and consequences for abuse and sadism.
The Court’s decision should make lower courts throughout the nation
remember the values they profess to stand by and consider what kind of society
America would be to allow its citizens to be caged under conditions as plainly

105

See, e.g., Martin A. Schwartz, How the Supreme Court Enables Police Excessive Force,
N.Y.
L.
J.
(June
5,
2020,
12:30
PM),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/06/05/how-the-supreme-court-enablespolice-excessive-force/; Andrew Chung et al., For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court
Protection,
REUTERS
(May
8,
2020,
12:00
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/.
106 Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 55 (Alito, J., concurring).
107 See, e.g., Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311–12 (10th Cir. 1998).
108 See Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998). The court relies on the one line
in Hutto and then concludes that the plaintiff was only in the cell for three days, and then
cites to an Eighth Circuit case that found no violation because of a four-day exposure to
sewage. Afterwards, the court then mentions cleaning supplies, claiming that they
“mitigat[ed] any intolerable conditions.” Id.
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horrific as they were here. Barbarities like what happened to Taylor cannot
stand if the Eighth Amendment is to have any meaning.
CONCLUSION
Trent Michael Taylor allegedly spent six days in two prison cells under
utterly abominable conditions.109 In the first cell, the floor, ceiling, walls, and
the faucet were caked with human feces.110 The second cell was freezing cold,
had no bunk, toilet, or sink, and contained only a drain hole in the floor that
smelled of ammonia and overflowed with raw sewage.111 In both cells, Taylor
was deprived of clothing and was completely naked.112 He went without food
during the entire time in the first cell for fear of contamination; and he held his
urine, for fear of overflowing an already clogged drain, before involuntarily
urinating on himself in the second cell.113
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit remanded
Taylor’s case to the district court.114 Whether or not Taylor will ultimately
prevail at trial will depend on whether he can establish the aforementioned
facts. Regardless of that, it is clear that qualified immunity should not have
been granted. The Fifth Circuit should have concluded that, assuming his
accusations to be true, Taylor had clearly established Eighth Amendment rights
that were violated. It should not have taken seven years and a Supreme Court
intervention for a judicial opinion memorializing this rather obvious
conclusion.

109
110
111
112
113
114

Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Taylor v. Stevens, 982 F.3d 959, 959–60 (5th Cir. 2020).

